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Author SHA1 Message Date
Kolbanidze 3d2c0def8a PCRSignature:initrd security fix
Reverted PCRSignature Phases=enter-initrd only with working systemd-tpm2-setup; small typo fixes
2026-03-22 01:29:52 +03:00
joel 15c254ab10 Remove Phases entry from PCRSignature section
Fixes issues causing failures in systemd-tpm2-setup-early.service and systemd-tpm2-setup.service.
2026-02-26 02:25:28 +05:30
joel 3525b9c25d Update README with TPM security recommendations
Add warning about sealing the TPM against raw PCR values
2026-02-26 02:16:38 +05:30
joel 6a5c3b6a9b Clarify usage of --tpm2-with-pin=no in documentation 2025-06-04 23:05:02 +05:30
joel c5240bcecd Merge pull request #3 from JimMoen/fix-minor-tips
fix: minor tips for mkinitcpio
2025-06-04 23:02:11 +05:30
JimMoen da67dbf8c6 fix: minor tips for mkinitcpio 2025-06-04 22:36:02 +08:00
Joel Mathew Thomas 9e39570341 Merge pull request #2 from emilsenan/patch-1
The value for tpm2-pin switch should be either yes or no
2024-12-26 01:28:29 +05:30
Emil Senan f45d500722 the value for tpm2-pin switch should be either yes or no 2024-12-25 19:55:15 +01:00
Joel Mathew Thomas 3fec16174e Update README.md 2024-09-11 23:35:39 +05:30
Joel Mathew Thomas ff0b9744e2 Update README.md 2024-09-11 19:22:21 +05:30
+70 -32
View File
@@ -17,12 +17,12 @@ Alternatively, from an existing Arch Linux installation run:
$ pacman-key -v archlinux-version-x86_64.iso.sig
```
This guide assumes that your system supports UEFI amd you have a `Wired Ethernet` connection.
This guide assumes that your system supports UEFI and you have a `Wired Ethernet` connection.
If you want to use `Wi-Fi`, refer to the [Arch Wiki](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/installation_guide#Connect_to_the_internet)
### 1. Disk Preparation
We'll use a 1024MB FAT32 system partition for our **EFI** partition , and for the root we'll use an **ext4** partition and a **SWAP** partition using **LVM2** logical volumes inside a LUKS encrypted partition.
We'll use a 1024MB FAT32 system partition for our **EFI** partition , and for the root we'll use an **ext4** partition and a **SWAP** partition using **LVM2** logical volumes inside a LUKS encrypted partition.
### 2. Partition the disks
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Open a terminal. Identify your disk. For this guide, we'll use /dev/nvme0n1 as a
Ensure the type is Linux filesystem.
Write Changes:
Select [ Write ].
Type yes to confirm.
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ After partitioning, `lsblk` will output the following.
$ lsblk
NAME MAJ:MIN RM SIZE RO TYPE MOUNTPOINT
nvme0n1 259:0 0 710G 0 disk
├─nvme0n1p1 259:1 0 1024M 0 part
├─nvme0n1p1 259:1 0 1024M 0 part
└─nvme0n1p2 259:2 0 709G 0 part
```
@@ -90,19 +90,20 @@ Now we, need to create the **LUKS2** encrypted container.
**Optional**: Overwriting your disk with random data is an optional step that can help prevent any possible recovery of old data. This is typically done before setting up the LUKS2 container to ensure the disk is fully erased.
Warning: This will erase all data on the disk. Ensure you have selected the correct device.
> [!WARNING]
> This will erase all data on the disk. Ensure you have selected the correct device.
```
dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/nvme0n1p2 bs=1M status=progress
```
Create the LUKS encrypted container at the designated partition. Enter the chosen password twice.
Create the LUKS encrypted container at the designated partition. Enter the chosen password twice.
```
# cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/nvme0n1p2
```
Open the container:
Open the container:
```
# cryptsetup open /dev/nvme0n1p2 cryptlvm
@@ -120,15 +121,16 @@ Create a physical volume on top of the opened LUKS container:
# pvcreate /dev/mapper/cryptlvm
```
Create a volume group (in this example, it is named `MyVolGroup`, but it can be whatever you want) and add the previously created physical volume to it:
Create a volume group (in this example, it is named `MyVolGroup`, but it can be whatever you want) and add the previously created physical volume to it:
```
# vgcreate MyVolGroup /dev/mapper/cryptlvm
```
Create all your logical volumes on the volume group:
Create all your logical volumes on the volume group:
**Tip**: If a logical volume will be formatted with ext4, leave at least 256 MiB free space in the volume group to allow using `e2scrub`. After creating the last volume with `-l 100%FREE`, this can be accomplished by reducing its size with `lvreduce -L -256M MyVolGroup/home`.
> [!TIP]
> If a logical volume will be formatted with ext4, leave at least 256 MiB free space in the volume group to allow using `e2scrub`. After creating the last volume with `-l 100%FREE`, this can be accomplished by reducing its size with `lvreduce -L -256M MyVolGroup/home`.
```
# lvcreate -L 4G MyVolGroup -n swap
@@ -168,9 +170,10 @@ Mount the partition to `/mnt/efi`:
### 6. Installation
**Note**: This section of the guide deals with installing the base system, setting up timezones, locale, hostname, hosts, creating new non-root user's, setting passwords for both `root` and `non-root` user accounts.
This is generally user specific configuration, and you might have a different setup you might, want to follow.
So it is recommended to refer to official [Arch Wiki Installation guide](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/installation_guide#Installation), for this section. And you may come back here and follow from the next section, when it is time to [configure mkinitcpio](https://github.com/joelmathewthomas/archinstall-luks2-lvm2-secureboot-tpm2#7-configure-mkinitcpio).
> [!NOTE]
> This section of the guide deals with installing the base system, setting up timezones, locale, hostname, hosts, creating new non-root user's, setting passwords for both `root` and `non-root` user accounts.
> This is generally user specific configuration, and you might have a different setup you might, want to follow.
> So it is recommended to refer to official [Arch Wiki Installation guide](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/installation_guide#Installation), for this section. And you may come back here and follow from the next section, when it is time to [configure mkinitcpio](https://github.com/joelmathewthomas/archinstall-luks2-lvm2-secureboot-tpm2#7-configure-mkinitcpio).
But, if you want to follow through, how I do it, feel free to follow through this section.
@@ -211,7 +214,7 @@ This command assumes the hardware clock is set to UTC.
Localization:
Edit `/etc/locale.gen` and uncomment `en_US.UTF-8 UTF-8` and other needed `UTF-8` locales. Generate the locales by running:
Edit `/etc/locale.gen` and uncomment `en_US.UTF-8 UTF-8` and other needed `UTF-8` locales. Generate the locales by running:
```
# locale-gen
@@ -286,12 +289,12 @@ Uncomment the following line:
Add new user to wheel group:
```
# usermod -G wheel newuser
# usermod -aG wheel newuser
```
### 7. Configure `mkinitcpio`
To build a working systemd based initramfs, modify the `HOOKS=` line in mkinitcpio.conf as follows:
To build a working systemd based initramfs, modify the `HOOKS=` line in mkinitcpio.conf as follows:
Add the following hooks: **systemd, keyboard, sd-vconsole, sd-encrypt, lvm2**
```
@@ -304,7 +307,7 @@ Do **not** regenerate the initramfs **yet**, as the `/efi/EFI/Linux` directory n
### 8. Set kernel command line
`mkinitcpio` supports reading kernel parameters from command line files in the `/etc/cmdline.d` directory. `mkinitcpio` will concatenate the contents of all files with a `.conf` extension in this directory and use them to generate the kernel command line. Any lines in the command line file that start with a # character are treated as comments and ignored by `mkinitcpio`.
`mkinitcpio` supports reading kernel parameters from command line files in the `/etc/cmdline.d` directory. `mkinitcpio` will concatenate the contents of all files with a `.conf` extension in this directory and use them to generate the kernel command line. Any lines in the command line file that start with a # character are treated as comments and ignored by `mkinitcpio`.
Create the `cmdline.d` directory:
@@ -361,6 +364,10 @@ The calculated policy will be included in the .pcrsig section.
When `.pcrsig` and/or `.pcrpkey` sections are present in a unified kernel image their contents are passed to the booted kernel in an synthetic initrd cpio archive that places them in the `/.extra/tpm2-pcr-signature.json` and `/.extra/tpm2-pcr-public-key.pem` files. Typically, a tmpfiles.d line then ensures they are copied into `/run/systemd/tpm2-pcr-signature.json` and `/run/systemd/tpm2-pcr-public-key.pem` where they remain accessible even after the system transitions out of the initrd environment into the host file system. Tools such as `systemd-cryptsetup@.service`, `systemd-cryptenroll` and `systemd-creds` will automatically use files present under these paths to unlock protected resources (encrypted storage or credentials) or bind encryption to booted kernels.
The `[PCRSignature:initrd]` section covers only the enter-initrd phase. This is the policy used by systemd-cryptenroll to unseal the LUKS key from the TPM. Once the boot progresses past this phase, PCR 11 gets extended and the initrd signature no longer matches, so the TPM will refuse to release the key
The `[PCRSignature:system]` section is separate and covers all four boot phases: enter-initrd, leave-initrd, sysinit, and ready. This is not used for LUKS unlock. It exists for systemd-tpm2-setup-early.service and systemd-tpm2-setup.service, which provision Storage Root Key (SRK) and NvPCR required by systemd-creds.
Create `uki.conf`
```
@@ -374,6 +381,11 @@ PCRBanks=sha256
Phases=enter-initrd
PCRPrivateKey=/etc/kernel/pcr-initrd.key.pem
PCRPublicKey=/etc/kernel/pcr-initrd.pub.pem
[PCRSignature:system]
Phases=enter-initrd leave-initrd sysinit ready
PCRPrivateKey=/etc/kernel/pcr-system.key.pem
PCRPublicKey=/etc/kernel/pcr-system.pub.pem
```
Generate the key for the PCR policy
@@ -384,9 +396,9 @@ sudo ukify genkey --config=/etc/kernel/uki.conf
### 11. Use `mkinitcpio` to generate the UKI
Now, modify `/etc/mkinitcpio.d/linux.preset`, as follows, with the appropriate mount point of the EFI system partition:
Now, modify `/etc/mkinitcpio.d/linux.preset`, as follows, with the appropriate mount point of the EFI system partition:
Here is a working example linux.preset for the linux kernel and the Arch splash screen.
Here is a working example linux.preset for the linux kernel and the Arch splash screen.
```
/etc/mkinitcpio.d/linux.preset
@@ -409,12 +421,20 @@ fallback_uki="/efi/EFI/Linux/arch-linux-fallback.efi"
fallback_options="-S autodetect"
```
> [!TIP]
> Regarding the situation where other kernels (such as `extra/linux-zen`) are installed, the corresponding `/etc/mkinitcpio.d/linux-zen.preset` file should be edited.
Finally, to build the **UKI**, make sure that the directory for the UKIs exist.
For example, for the linux preset:
For example, for the linux preset:
```
# mkdir -p /efi/EFI/Linux
```
> [!TIP]
> All kernel UKI efi files are located in this directory, including `extra/linux-zen`.
>
> That is to say, regardless of which kernel you use, you only need to create this one directory.
Now install the `lvm2` package:
```
@@ -427,6 +447,11 @@ Now, regenerate `initramfs`:
# mkinitcpio -p linux
```
> [!TIP]
> Use the command `mkinitcpio -P` to generate all initramfs at once for multiple kernels.
>
> Or use `mkinitcpio -p linux-zen` for `extra/linux-zen`.
### 12. Configuring the boot loader
Install `systemd-boot` with:
@@ -465,7 +490,8 @@ Now to configure secure boot , first install the `sbctl` utility:
$ pacman -S sbctl
```
**Note**: It might say completed installation with some errors, that's fine because sbctl can't find the key database, because there never was one.
> [!NOTE]
> It might say completed installation with some errors, that's fine because sbctl can't find the key database, because there never was one.
Now run ```sbctl status``` and ensure setup mode is enabled.
@@ -502,7 +528,9 @@ delimitered string.
Default: "db,KEK"
```
**Warnings:** If using the flag `--tpm-eventlog`, results in a warning or error, just ignore it. It means that operation is not supported on your specific device. Trying to force it can soft brick your device.
> [!WARNING]
> If using the flag `--tpm-eventlog`, results in a warning or error, just ignore it.
> It means that operation is not supported on your specific device. Trying to force it can soft brick your device.
Some firmware is signed and verified with Microsoft's keys when secure boot is enabled. Not validating devices could brick them. To enroll your keys without enrolling Microsoft's, run: `sbctl enroll-keys`. Only do this if you know what you are doing.
@@ -513,7 +541,7 @@ Check the secure boot status again:
$ sbctl status
```
sbctl should be installed now, but secure boot will not work until the boot files have been signed with the keys you just created.
sbctl should be installed now, but secure boot will not work until the boot files have been signed with the keys you just created.
Check what files need to be signed for secure boot to work:
@@ -530,7 +558,7 @@ Now sign all the unsigned files. Most probably these are the files you need to s
/efi/EFI/systemd/systemd-bootx64.efi
```
The files that need to be signed will depend on your system's layout, kernel and boot loader.
The files that need to be signed will depend on your system's layout, kernel and boot loader.
```
$ sbctl sign --save /efi/EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.EFI
@@ -555,7 +583,7 @@ System:
Boot into FW: supported
```
Optionally, remove any leftover `initramfs-*.img` from `/boot` or `/efi`.
Optionally, remove any leftover `initramfs-*.img` from `/boot` or `/efi`.
### 16. Enrolling the TPM
@@ -576,7 +604,7 @@ $ sudo systemd-cryptenroll /dev/nvme0n1p2 --recovery-key
Save or write down the recovery key in some safe and secure place.
To check that the new recovery key was enrolled, dump the LUKS configuration and look for a systemd-tpm2 token entry, as well as an additional entry in the Keyslots section:
To check that the new recovery key was enrolled, dump the LUKS configuration and look for a systemd-tpm2 token entry, as well as an additional entry in the Keyslots section:
```
$ cryptsetup luksDump /dev/nvme0n1p2
@@ -588,9 +616,14 @@ We'll now enroll our system firmware and secure boot state.
This would allow our TPM to unlock our encrypted drive, as long as the state hasn't changed.
```
$ sudo systemd-cryptenroll --tpm2-device=auto --tpm2-pcrs=0+7 --tpm2-public-key /etc/kernel/pcr-initrd.pub.pem /dev/nvme0n1p2
$ sudo systemd-cryptenroll --tpm2-device=auto --tpm2-pcrs=0+7 --tpm2-public-key /etc/kernel/pcr-initrd.pub.pem --tpm2-with-pin=yes /dev/nvme0n1p2
```
> [!WARNING]
> It is recommended to use a pin to unlock the TPM, instead of allowing it to unlock automatically, for more security.
> Use `--tpm2-with-pin=no` **only** if you are comfortable with TPM unlocking without user interaction (this is the default behavior).
> Do not use `--tpm2-pcrs=11` here. This option seals the LUKS key to the current raw PCR value and will break after kernel or initramfs updates.
```
Additional Flags
@@ -599,7 +632,12 @@ When enrolling a TPM2 device, controls whether to require the user to enter a PI
Note that incorrect PIN entry when unlocking increments the TPM dictionary attack lockout mechanism, and may lock out users for a prolonged time, depending on its configuration. The lockout mechanism is a global property of the TPM, systemd-cryptenroll does not control or configure the lockout mechanism. You may use tpm2-tss tools to inspect or configure the dictionary attack lockout, with tpm2_getcap(1) and tpm2_dictionarylockout(1) commands, respectively.
```
**Note**: Including PCR0 in the PCRs can cause the entry to become invalid after every firmware update. This happens because PCR0 reflects measurements of the firmware, and any update to the firmware will change these measurements, invalidating the TPM2 entry. If you prefer to avoid this issue, you might exclude PCR0 and use only PCR7 or other suitable PCRs.
> [!NOTE]
> Including PCR0 in the PCRs can cause the entry to become invalid after every firmware update.
> This happens because PCR0 reflects measurements of the firmware, and any update to the firmware will change these measurements, invalidating the TPM2 entry.
> If you prefer to avoid this issue, you might exclude PCR0 and use only PCR7 or other suitable PCRs.
>
> For reference see discussion: [PCR_0_should_be_avoided](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Talk:Trusted_Platform_Module#PCR_0_should_be_avoided)
Info on all additional PCRs can be found [here](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Trusted_Platform_Module#Accessing_PCR_registers).
@@ -612,7 +650,7 @@ Now if at some point later in time, our secure boot state has changed, the TPM w
This can be done in a very short step and is less prone to error by running the following command:
```
systemd-cryptenroll --wipe-slot=tpm2 /dev/<device> --tpm2-pcrs=0+7
systemd-cryptenroll --wipe-slot=tpm2 /dev/<device> --tpm2-pcrs=0+7 --tpm2-public-key /etc/kernel/pcr-initrd.pub.pem --tpm2-with-pin=<yes/no>
```
Or, if you prefer to do it manually, do the following:
@@ -632,11 +670,11 @@ In the **Tokens**: section, look for systemd-tmp2, and under it find the keyslot
```
Tokens:
0: systemd-recovery
Keyslot: 1
Keyslot: 1
1: systemd-tpm2
...
...
Keyslot: 2
Keyslot: 2
```
As you can see keyslot **1** is used by `systemd-recovery` and **2** is used by `systemd-tpm2`
@@ -653,7 +691,7 @@ $ sudo cryptsetup token remove --token-id 1 /dev/nvme0n1p2
```
Here we specify `token-id` as `1` based on the previous output of `luksDump`. Specify it correspondingy depending on what the token number is on your output of `luksDump`.
Now repeat the steps from [TPM enrollment](https://github.com/joelmathewthomas/archinstall-luks2-lvm2-secureboot-tpm2?tab=readme-ov-file#13-enrolling-the-tpm) to renroll to the TPM.
Now repeat the steps from [TPM enrollment](https://github.com/joelmathewthomas/archinstall-luks2-lvm2-secureboot-tpm2?tab=readme-ov-file#16-enrolling-the-tpm) to renroll to the TPM.
With this, the guide has mostly covered on how to install Arch Linux, Encrypt disk with LUKS2 , use logical volumes with LVM2, how to setup Secure Boot, and how to enroll the TPM.